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OUTPUT SMOOTHING IN EMU AND OECD: CAN WE 
FOREGO GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION? 




This paper analyses the smoothing of asymmetric shocks to output for a sample of OECD 
countries. It also examines whether the private capital markets will be able to replace the 
government in providing output smoothing in the euro-area, in the near future. The research 
finds no evidence of large differences in the patterns of risk sharing for the 19 OECD 
countries, the EU-15 or euro-area countries, for the period 1970-1999. However, there were 
shown to be considerable differences between the euro-area and the successful monetary 
union of the USA: the euro-area showed a much lower insurance of asymmetric shocks than 
the US states. Until increasing economic integration in Europe does not lead to a substantial 
decrease in the incidence of idiosyncratic shocks, such shocks may impose non-negligible 
welfare costs.  
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1-  Introduction 
  This paper analyses the patterns of output smoothing for the euro-area and for 
OECD economies, and identifies the different channels of risk sharing among such 
countries. It also compares the results obtained with those of the US states. By taking the 
successful monetary union of the USA as a benchmark, interesting conclusions can be 
drawn concerning the degree of preparation of the EMU and OECD countries in dealing 
with asymmetric shocks. When countries give up their independent monetary policies, and 
the ability to use the exchange rate mechanism to engage in monetary union, they should be 
able to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks. If this is not the case, the constitution of the 
monetary union could be rather costly.  
 
In the USA, the federal budget redistributes income among the different states. In 
Europe, the EMU has no similar tool for doing this, and the national fiscal policies are 
constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Is it possible to run successfully a 
monetary union without a central (federal) budget or with constrained national fiscal 
policies? In other words, what is the role of the government sector in smoothing out 
asymmetric shocks in OECD countries? Could the government sector be substituted by 
private capital markets to provide risk sharing? These are some of the questions that this 
study tries to answer. 
 
In Europe, the EMU will certainly lead to increased financial integration among euro 
member countries, and financial markets will be able to contribute to smoothing out shocks 
in a monetary union. This contribution is made via two different channels. Firstly, 
individuals resident in a monetary union might share risk through the cross-ownership of 
assets. If asset portfolios are regionally diversified, their holders are better protected against 
asymmetric shocks. By holding internationally diversified portfolios, individuals can 
reduce the exposure of their income and wealth to national idiosyncratic shocks on output, 
which facilitates consumption smoothing. Secondly, in a monetary union, the economic 
agents are able to smooth the pattern of aggregated consumption by borrowing or lending 
internationally.  Monetary union increases the depth of the credit market. Thus, if financial 
markets are sufficiently integrated, these mechanisms could play a crucial role in the 
smoothing of (asymmetric) business cycles and in the stability of the monetary union.  
 
The degree of financial integration in Europe is still considerably less than in other 
monetary unions. However, the introduction of the euro in 1999, and the resulting 
disappearance of exchange rate risk among the 12 EU countries, is leading to an increasing 
financial integration in the euro-area. According to the ‘official consensus’, the 
development of Euroland financial markets will help to accomplish a sufficient degree of 
risk sharing among EMU members, enabling them to smooth out asymmetric shocks. In 
this regard, the European Commission has put great emphasis on the study of Asdrubali, 
Sørensen and Yosha (1996), which concluded that, in the case of the U. S. States, financial 
markets play a much larger role than federal government transfers as channels of inter-state  
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risk sharing. Such results enabled the Commission to conclude that “in Europe, more 
integrated capital and credit markets should greatly enhance the capacity of Member States 
to respond to shocks, as is presently the case for US states.”
1 Consequently, an analysis will 
be made here of how the increasing integration of the bond and equity markets in Euroland 
might enhance the potential of risk sharing among member states. In order to do so, the 
results obtained for Euroland will be compared with those of the US. This analysis is 
important because increasing risk sharing reduces the pressure exerted on the ECB, and on 
national fiscal authorities, to deal with shocks concentrated in one or more countries.  
 
In short, the focus of this paper will be on whether capital markets could replace 
governments in providing output smoothing for the euro area in the near future. To achieve 
this, the importance of the different channels of risk sharing in both OECD and EU 
countries must be quantified, and the smoothing provided by saving broken down into 
government and private contributions. Moreover, this paper will: 
a)  Verify whether it is possible to identify a difference in the pattern of output 
smoothing between the euro-12 countries and the larger OECD group. More 
precisely, it will evaluate whether Euroland economies were better prepared in 1999 
to enter monetary union than the other countries studied. 
b)  Assess the impact of the eventual enlargement of the euro area to include the UK, 
Sweden and Denmark. 
c)  Determine whether the level of government deficit/debt has any impact on the 
pattern of risk sharing. 
d)  Compare the patterns of risk sharing in the OECD, in the EU-15, and in Euroland 
using the monetary union of the USA as a benchmark. 
e)  Study how the pattern of output smoothing has evolved over time. In this regard, it 
will be seen whether the degree of stabilisation provided by financial markets has 
increased over time, or not. This analysis will also be helpful in determining how 
output smoothing is likely to evolve in the near future. 
f)  Determine whether the size of countries has an effect on risk sharing patterns. 
 
In order to accomplish these objectives, we will use the international extension of the 
aforementioned method of Asdrubali et al. (1996), as proposed by Sørensen and Yosha 
(1998). A panel data estimation will be used for the period 1970-1999 for the 19 OECD 
economies. The sample considered includes all 15 EU economies (with the exception of 
Luxembourg) and the economies of Norway, the USA, Canada, Australia and Japan.  
 
In comparison with previously published literature, this paper uses a significantly 
increased sample of data (both in terms of the number of years studied and the number of 
countries involved) and tests new and interesting hypotheses. More specifically, when 
compared with the study of Sørensen and Yosha (1998) the results given here have been 
widened to include the 1990s, and the sample of countries taken has been considerably 
enlarged from 8 EU countries to comprise all euro-area and EU-15 economies with the 
                                                 
1 Buti and Sapir (1998: 29).  
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exception of Luxembourg. Although this is the result of the imposition of some hypotheses 
in making data from different sources compatible, it enables us to make more reliable and 
interesting conclusions concerning the process of European integration. This paper also 
tests the above-mentioned hypotheses that, to the best of our knowledge, have not yet been 
tested in the literature. 
 
2-  Methodology 
Different channels of risk sharing will be estimated for the period 1970-1999, for a 
group of 19 OECD economies, which includes all EU-15 economies (except Luxembourg) 
along with Norway, Canada, Australia, the USA, and Japan. The main source of data is the 
OECD national accounts statistics, complemented with other sources, as described in 
Appendix A. In order to identify the different channels of the smoothing of asymmetric 
shocks to GDP, we will use the method proposed by Sørensen and Yosha (1998). This 
method extends the method proposed by Asdrubali et al. (1996) for the US states, to an 
international level. 
 
The method enables the identification of four different channels of income and 
consumption smoothing among different countries or regions: 
  The first is factor income. When there is cross-ownership of productive assets, 
individuals of one country have claims on the output of other countries, as the 
national citizens that invested in other countries have the right to the return on that 
capital. The income derived from these cross-border financial investments will 
then co-move with the income of other countries. This enables income smoothing 
through the cross-border ownership of productive assets, and provides insurance 
against asymmetric shocks that might hit their own national economies. 
  Secondly, international transfers smooth income if the net transfers from abroad 
are larger during idiosyncratic recessions. 
  Thirdly, saving and dis-saving, i.e. inter-temporal consumption smoothing, may 
also contribute to inter-country consumption smoothing. Consumers may adjust 
their savings in response to income shocks; corporations may increase or decrease 
retained earnings in response to profitability shocks; and, government net savings 
may behave in a counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical way. 
  And, finally, capital depreciation may also contribute to cross-country income 
smoothing. 
 
The factor income effect is reflected in the National Accounts as the difference 
between gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP). Net international 
transfers are measured as the difference between disposable national income (DNI) and 
national income (NI).
2 The difference between total consumption and disposable income is 
                                                 
2 However, in our view, the difference between DNI and NI could involve some degree of smoothing through 
the government budget, which might give rise to an interaction with net government saving smoothing.  
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total net saving, reflecting consumption smoothing. Capital depreciation is responsible for 
the difference between GNP and DNI.
3 
 
The benchmark of the method of Sørensen and Yosha (1998) is full risk sharing. 
When risk is fully shared within a group of countries, the consumption of a country co-
moves with world consumption but does not co-move with country specific shocks [see 




tt t C G k GDP +=  (1) 
where k
i is a country specific constant representing the fixed proportion claims on world 
output of country i, C is private consumption and G is government consumption.
4 As a 
result, each country’s consumption growth is perfectly correlated with world consumption 
growth. According to Olivei (2000) there are three key assumptions behind full risk sharing 
with complete markets. First, it is necessary to have perfect capital mobility across 
countries. Secondly, asset markets must be complete, to ensure that all idiosyncratic 
consumption risks are insurable. This requires that individuals have available for trade in 
world capital markets a set of assets sufficiently large to cover all possible future 
contingencies.
5 Thirdly, each country’s output must be tradable in order to allow the trade 
on assets that involve claims on its domestic output to take place. If a portion of domestic 
output is non-tradable, it is not possible to put international trade claims on it. 
Consequently, it is not possible to diversify the risks arising from fluctuations in non-
tradable output in international asset markets; such risks must be borne entirely by domestic 
consumers. For (1) to hold, it is also necessary to assume perfect substitution between 
private and public consumption, as a well as the exogeneity of GDP shocks. A derivation of 
this equation can be found in Sørensen and Yosha (1998: 215-217).
6 It should be 
remembered, however, that the purpose of this method is not to test the hypothesis of full 
risk sharing, but to break down the degree of observed (full or partial) risk sharing into 
several components. 
 
In order to decompose the cross-sectional variance of shocks to GDP Sørensen and 





ii i i i
GDP GNP NI DNI
GDP C G




                                                                                                                                                     
Consider for example a tax cut that leads to an increased household’s disposable income. If Ricardian 
equivalence does not hold, increased consumption results. The counterpart of the increased household’s 
disposable income is an increase in government net lending. However, it is not possible to control this second 
order potential for interaction. 
3 Following OECD National Accounts concepts, GNP = GDP + net factor inflow to the country; NI = GNP - 
depreciation; DNI = NI + net international transfers; and, C + G= NI- net saving. 
4 Sørensen and Yosha (1998: 217) show that under the assumption of logarithm utility, the share of country i’s 
world consumption is the discounted expected share of its future output in world consumption. 
5 This implies that a worker should be able to insure his labour income against unemployment and against all 
other contingencies that might occur Olivei (2000: 4). 
6 The derivation is based on the assumption of identical risk averse expected utility maximizer consumers.  
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where all variables are measured in per capita real terms,
7 and i is an index of countries; the 
time index was suppressed. C+G is the total consumption (the sum of private and public 
consumption).
8 Taking logs and differences, multiplying both sides by ∆ log GDP
i (minus 
its mean), and taking the cross-sectional average, leads to the following decomposition of 








var{ logGDP } cov{ logGDP , logGDP logGNP }
cov{ logGDP , logGNP logNI }
cov{ logGDP , logNI logDNI }
cov{ logGDP , logDNI log(C G )}
cov{ logGDP , log(C G )}
∆= ∆ ∆ − ∆
+∆ ∆ − ∆
+∆ ∆ − ∆




A further division by the variance of ∆log GDP
i yields: 
 
  fd su 1 τ =β +β +β +β +β  (3) 




tt f , t f t f , t
ii i i
tt d , t d t d , t
ii i i
tt , t t , t
ii i i i
tt t s , t st s , t
ii i
tt u , t u t
logGDP logGNP logGDP u
logGNP log NI logGDP u
log NI logDNI logGDP u
logDNI log(C G ) logGDP u
log(C G ) logGDP
τ ττ
∆− ∆= ν + β ∆+
∆− ∆ = ν + β ∆+
∆− ∆ = ν + β ∆ +
∆− ∆ + = ν + β ∆+





where the ν.,t are time fixed effects. According to SY98, the inclusion of these time effects 
is crucial in capturing year-specific impacts on growth rates, i.e. the impact of aggregated 
OECD production. The β coefficients are interpreted as giving the incremental percentage 
amount of smoothing achieved at each level. βf captures the amount of smoothing  provided 
by factor income; βd gives the amount of smoothing endorsed to capital depreciation flows; 
βt captures the international transfers smoothing; βs captures the smoothing provided by 
saving; and finally, βu gives the percentage of shocks that are left unsmoothed. We will 
empirically estimate system (4).
9 
 
The pioneering work of Asdrubali et al. (1996) for the US states identified only three 
levels of smoothing: capital market, federal government, and the credit market. Hence, the 
                                                 
7 The consumption deflator was used to deflate all variables, measuring the output and consumption of each 
country in terms of real consumption within that country. 
8 As mentioned in footnote 3, the variables are defined according to OECD National Account conventions. 
9 The purpose of this method is to discover the extent to which asymmetric shocks are smoothed. However, as 
only temporary shocks should be smoothed, this method should not capture permanent shocks. The first 
difference formulation and the time fixed effects should be sufficient to ensure that outcome. Moreover, 
Sørensen and Yosha (1998: note 23, p. 225) check the robustness of their main regressions using Hodrick-
Prescott filtered data, reaching very similar results.  
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degree of detail is greater when different countries are considered. In fact, country level 
data is richer and less prone to measurement errors than US state level data. For instance, 
there are no official estimates for the GDP or GNP in the US states. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to aggregate the more detailed levels of smoothing of the international extension 
into the three channels obtained for the US states. It is only necessary to further divide the 
amount of smoothing that occurs via saving (in the international extension) into 
government saving, corporate saving, and personal saving.
10 The capital market smoothing 
is then the result of the sum of the effects of factor income, capital depreciation, and 
corporate saving. US federal government smoothing (through the federal tax-transfer and 
grant system) is comparable with income smoothing via international transfers. Finally, US 
consumption smoothing via credit markets corresponds to smoothing through both personal 
and government saving. 
 
Instead of using the original method of Sørensen and Yosha (1998), we could have 
used the modified version proposed by Mélitz and Zumer (1999). These authors modified 
the original model of Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha by adding four additional variables 
(including openness). They also considered the total amount of shocks left unsmoothed (βu) 
to be pre-determined and used a different estimation method. Another crucial difference 
rested in the interpretation of the beta coefficients. Mélitz and Zumer (1999) departed from 
a different national accounting identity, and consequently identified different channels of 
risk sharing. However, in order to make our results comparable with previous literature we 
decided to use the original method of Sørensen and Yosha (1998). 
 
 
Panel data estimation comments 
As mentioned above, estimates will be based on panel data regressions.  Compared 
with pure cross-section or time-series studies, the use of panel data has the advantage of 
allowing control of individual heterogeneity. Following Baltagi (2001), the general 
specification of a panel data regression is: 
 
'
it it it Y X u ,   i 1,...,N; t 1,...,T =α+ β+ = =  
 
The variables have a double subscript, i for the individuals (countries, firms, 
households, etc.), and t for time. These subscripts reflect the cross-section and the time-
series dimensions, respectively. The error component disturbances take the following 
structure: 
it i t it u = µ+ λ+ ν 
                                                 
10 Corporate saving smoothing essentially captures the effect of retained earnings behaviour. If, when profits 
decrease, the amount of dividends remains more or less the same (due to a reduction in retained earnings), 




where µi stands for the unobservable individual-specific effect, λt is the unobservable time 
effect and νit is the remainder stochastic disturbance term independent and identically 




Either the fixed effects model or the random effects model can be used depending on 
the assumptions made on the unobservable components of the error term. In our practical 
estimation the time fixed effects model will be used, i.e. it will be assumed that λt is fixed, 
µi is nil and νit is stochastic. Furthermore, the Xit will be assumed to be independent of νit  
for all i and t.  
 
When using fixed effects, the inference is conditional on the particular set of countries 
and over the specific time periods observed. Some of the known limitations of the use of 
time fixed effects are the large loss of degrees of freedom,
11 and the impossibility of 




Another possibility would be to estimate the model using random effects. In this case, 
it would be assumed that both µi and λt were random. This would avoid the loss of degrees 
of freedom implied by the use of fixed effects, and the inference would pertain to the large 
population from which the sample was drawn. However, this technique would only be 
appropriate if we were drawing the N individuals randomly from a large population. Thus, 
it would be necessary to have a representative panel of the whole population we were trying 
to make inferences about. This is clearly not the case here: we are considering 19 OECD 
countries, i.e. almost the whole population of the developed OECD members. Moreover, as 
the sample will be split into sub-samples, we need our conclusions to be conditional on the 
particular sub-sample that is being used.  In short, and in this particular case, the 
econometric theory clearly points to the use of the fixed effects model. 
 
When using the time fixed effects model, we can choose from using individual fixed 
effects, time fixed effects, or both. As Sørensen and Yosha (1998: 224-225) point out, the 
use of time fixed effects is “crucial” in this application, given that they capture year-
specific impacts on GDP growth rates, i.e. the impact of aggregate OECD GDP. As a result, 
time fixed effects will also be used in our empirical estimates to make them comparable to 
those of Arreaza et al. (1998) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998), hereafter referred to as 
ASY98, and SY98 respectively.  
 
The system (4) was estimated by SY98 and ASY98 using a two-step Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS) method (assuming a common AR1 process and allowing for state 
specific variances of the error terms since GDP is in general more volatile for small 
countries). In our empirical estimation will also correct for autocorrelation, but in a 
different way from that of ASY98: a common AR1 process will not be imposed for all 
equations. 
                                                 
11 The estimators are obtained using time or individual dummies. 
12 The time-invariant variables ‘disappear’ when the within regression is estimated, which uses deviations 




3-  Empirical results for euro-area and OECD countries 
Our main results use a sample of 19 OECD economies
13 for the period 1970-1999.
14 
The presentation of these results begins with a replication of those of ASY98, and is 
followed by our main results. Then the contribution of saving to smoothing will be divided 
into private and government components. Whether the level of deficit/debt has any 
influence on the smoothing provided by the public and private sectors will also be 
investigated. Next, our results will be compared with those obtained for the US states. 
Subsequently, the way in which the pattern of risk sharing changes when the economy 
faces more persistent shocks will be analysed. Finally, an analysis will be made of the 
evolution of the pattern of risk sharing over time. 
 
3.1  Comparison with ASY98’s results 
The presentation of our results begins with a replication (and extension) of those obtained 
by Arreaza et al. (1998)
15 in Table 1. Columns (1) and (4) show ASY98 results for 8 and 11 
European Union economies, respectively.
16 Columns (2) and (5) show our own replication. 
 
Table 1- Channels of income and consumption spending (%)- Replication and extension of the 
results of ASY (1998, table 3.1) 
 EU-8  EU-11* 
  ASY(98)  Own estimate  ASY(98)  Own estimate 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  1971-93  1971-93 1971-99  1980-93 1980-93 1980-99 1971-99 
Factor income (βf)  -1 0 -2  -3 -4 -7 -4 
  (1) 
 
(0) (1)  (2) (1) (3) (2) 
Capital Depreciation (βd)  -8 -11 -11  -8 -13 -14 -12 
 (8) 
 
(7) (8)  (8) (6) (7) (9) 
International   3 2 2  5 4 4 2 
Transfers (βt)  (2) 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (3) (3) (2) 
Saving (βs)  50 53 54  37 42 48 54 
  (10) 
 
(10) (11)  (7)  (6)  (7)  (13) 
Not Smoothed (βu)  56 56 58  69 70 70 60 
  (14)  (11) (13)  (14) (11) (13) (15) 
Notes: Absolute T-stats in brackets. Arreaza et al. (1998) report standard errors in their tables, thus the corresponding 
T-stats for ASY98 were obtained by dividing the coefficient estimate by its standard deviation, ignoring any (non-
                                                 
13 The sample includes all EU economies (except Luxembourg), along with Norway, Canada, Australia, USA, 
and Japan. 
14 As the estimation requires a calculation of the growth rates, we loose the first observation, thus reducing the 
sample length to the 1971-1999 period. 
15 The results of ASY98 have the advantage of being more up-to-date than those of SY98. 
16 The sample of eleven EU economies does not correspond to the first euro-11 countries.  
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reported) rescaling. In our estimates we corrected for first order serial correlation (AR1) using a two-step search 
procedure in Winrats 5.01. Where necessary, results were rescaled to sum 100%. The ASY98’s EU8 sample comprises: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, and the UK. The ASY98 EU-11* sample consists of: EU8 + 
Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden. It does not correspond to the first euro-11 countries. 
 
Despite some probable revisions of data, and a slightly different estimation method,
17 
very similar results to those of ASY98
18were obtained. For the 1971-93 period and for the 
EU8 sample, the amount of unsmoothed shocks is exactly the same, but there are some 
small differences in the composition of smoothing. For the EU-11* sample and for the 
period 1980-93, comparing our results (column 5) with original ASY98 results (column 4), 
we can conclude that the percentage of unsmoothed shocks is roughly the same (70%). 
Irrespective of the estimate, the large difference in the amount of shocks left unsmoothed in 
the OECD countries when compared to US states
19 is striking. However, there are some 
differences in the composition of channels responsible for the smoothing of shocks: capital 
depreciation and factor income show a more negative dis-smoothing effect in our estimate, 
which in turn is compensated for by increased smoothing by saving.  
 
Extending the duration of the EU8 sample to the end of the 1990s (column 3), has no 
major effect on the results: factor income is found to destabilise output, while the 
smoothing provided by saving shows a marginal increase.  The overall result is only a small 
increase in the percentage of unsmoothed shocks (from 56% to 58%).  
 
With regard to the sample of 11 European economies, extending the results to 1999 
leaves the amount of unsmoothed shocks unaltered. However, there is an increase in the 
amount of dis-smoothing by factor income (and capital depreciation) that is being 
compensated for by an increase in smoothing by saving. However, it should also be 
mentioned that the coefficient on factor income (βf) is generally estimated with low 
precision, as reflected in the relatively low T-statistics. Extending the estimation period 
back to 1971, i.e. adding the 1970s to the sample, leads to a decrease in the percentage of 
unsmoothed shocks, which is a result both of a decrease in the dis-smoothing by factor 
income and capital depreciation and an increase in the smoothing provided by saving. This 
reflects the fact that the last two decades of the XX
th century where characterized by a 
lower degree of income smoothing than the more extended 1971-99 period: the amount of 
shocks to income left unsmoothed for the period of 1971-99 (and for EU-11) is 10 
percentage points lower than for the 1980-99 period. As we shall see later, this is mainly 
                                                 
17 As already mentioned above, in contrast to ASY98, we do not impose an identical autocorrelation 
parameter across equations. 
18 In general, our results in column 5, for EU-11*, are more similar to the results of ASY98 represented in 
column 1 for the OECD than to ASY98’s results for EU-11* (column 4). More specifically, the low level of 
smoothing provided by saving for EU-11* countries is not present in our estimations. In fact, for the period 
1971-99, the amount of shocks smoothed by saving, and the amount of shocks left unsmoothed, are very 
similar between both samples of countries. 
19 According to ASY96, only 19% of shocks to each state GSP were left unsmoothed in the US federation, in 
the period 1981-1990. Hence, the amount of risk sharing among OECD and EU countries is substantially 
inferior to its counterpart in the US states. In point 3.5, below, we will make a detailed comparison of the 
results obtained for the OECD and EU countries with the results regarding the US states.  
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the result of including the first half of the 1990s. Some possible explanations are related to 
the events that occurred in that period. 
 
The early 1990s were characterized by extraordinary events that particularly affected 
Europe: first, there was the collapse of the USSR, then German reunification and the 
September 1992 crisis regarding the European Monetary System (EMS).
20 The break up of 
the USSR had clear negative impact on Nordic countries’ (especially Finland’s) exports to 
the former USSR area. Moreover, some of the mechanisms advanced by Krugman (1993) 
might also have played a role. That is, the negative shock to Finland’s GDP might have 
induced an exodus of capital that may have caused an even larger negative variation on 
such countries’ GNP, which might help to explain the negative coefficient of factor income 
smoothing. German reunification, the subsequent tightening of monetary policy all over 
Europe, and the EMS crisis may also have decreased the potential for risk sharing.  
3.2  Main results 
Table 2 shows our main results regarding the different channels of risk sharing, 
divided into different sub-samples of countries for the period of 1970-1999. 
 
Table 2- Channels of income and consumption spending (%)- different country 
samples 1970-1999 
  All  Small EU15 EU11 EU12 Small 






Factor income (βf)  -2 -1 -1 -1  0 -1 -2 -3  2 
 (1) 
 
(1) (1) (1) (0) (0) (1) (1) (1) 
Capital   -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -8 -8 -3  -11 
Depreciation (βd) (7) 
 
(6) (6) (5) (6) (6) (4) (1) (4) 
International   -1 -2 -1 -3 -2 -3  2  1  3 
Transfers (βt) (1) 
 
(2) (1) (2) (2) (2) (3) (0) (2) 
Saving (βs)  50 52 51 51 53 52 47 41 44 
 (15) 
 
(12)  (12) (9)  (11)  (10) (9) (4) (5) 
Not Smoothed (βu)  59 59 59 60 56 59 60 64 62 
  (20) (16) (16) (13) (13) (14) (13)  (6)  (7) 
Notes: AR1 estimation. EU11: first 11 euro countries (with the exception of Luxembourg): Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. EU12: EU11 + Greece. EU15: EU12+ Denmark, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. G7: Canada, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Japan and USA. Small countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
South periphery EU: Spain, Greece, Portugal. Core EU: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. All 
stands for the whole sample of 19 OECD economies: EU15 + Australia, Canada, Norway, United States, and Japan. T-
statistics are in brackets. Estimates corrected for first order serial correlation (AR1) using a two-step search procedure in 
Winrats 5.01. Where necessary, results were rescaled to sum 100%. 
 
Focusing on the results for the whole sample of 19 OECD economies, it can be seen 
that only 41% of shocks to GDP among countries were smoothed. The only channel that 
                                                 
20 See, Gros and Thygesen (1998) for a detailed analysis of the EMS crisis.  
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effectively smoothes income is saving (50%), while all other channels that might 
potentially smooth income are actually leading to income dis-smoothing: factor income 
flows dis-smoothed output by -2%;
21 capital depreciation also has a negative contribution 
of -7%; and international transfers have a non-statistically significant impact of -1%. With 
the exception of the negative contribution from international transfers, the results are 
similar to those of ASY98 for the period 1971-1993. 
 
The lack of smoothing through factor income flows might be interpreted as the result 
of the absence of significant cross-ownership of productive assets among OECD 
economies. This result is inline with the usual ‘home bias’ in the composition of portfolios. 
Moreover, the contagious effect in financial markets might also limit risk-sharing benefits 
from holding an internationally diversified portfolio.
22 International transfers do not seem 
to be motivated by income smoothing motivations. In the EU such transfers are mainly due 
to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), structural funds and their counterpart – the 
member states contributions to the EU budget. However, the resources of the EU budget 
have a ceiling of 1.27% of the Union’s GNP (the actual figure in 2001 was 1.11% of GNP). 
Consequently, the EU budget has a very small influence on the European Union’s income, 
limiting its contribution to the smoothing of output shocks. Capital depreciation is 
responsible for the difference between National Income and GNP. Its negative contribution 
to smoothing may be in part the result of how national accounts data is calculated.
23  
 
As mentioned above, saving is the only operative smoothing channel.
24 It is the result 
of the net saving decisions of households, corporations and governments. This aggregated 
figure will be subdivided below into government and private contributions. While 
smoothing via saving does not necessarily require actual cross-country flows of funds, it 
may involve such flows given that aggregate consumption smoothing via saving is more 
difficult in a closed economy (SY98: 227). 
 
In the same table, our sample of countries has been divided into different sub-
samples. As mentioned in the introduction, we wish to test a set of interesting hypotheses, 
namely to determine whether the size of a country has any relevance to patterns of output 
smoothing among countries. Consequently, we considered the G7 group of large countries 
separately from the group of small countries, within which the EU members were also 
isolated. We also wish to determine whether European Union (EU) countries and euro-area 
economies are in any way different from the larger OECD group. Hence, we isolated EU-
15 countries, the euro-area economies (both the present 12 members and the first 11 
                                                 
21 However, as the low t-statistic indicates, the coefficient on factor income smoothing is not statistically 
different from zero. 
22 In our opinion, the best way to diversify risk in increasingly integrated international financial markets, 
characterized by ever more correlated returns, is the holding of sector-diversified portfolios.  
23 Capital depreciation follows rigid accounting rules, being more or less independent of the business cycle. If, 
in reality, capital depreciation were affected by the business cycle, we would expect capital depreciation to 
decrease in recessions (reflecting a lower utilisation of productive capacity), leading to a lower volatility of NI 
with respect to GNP, and in that way to a positive βd coefficient. However, such events are not likely to be 
captured in National Accounts data. 
24 Moreover, its coefficients are all statistically significant.  
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members). Furthermore, and in the spirit of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) the “EU 
core” and the EU southern “periphery” were also considered.  
 
As for the results regarding the different sub-samples, we can state that in general no 
considerable differences are to be found among such groups of countries. In fact, the 
picture for those sub-samples is not considerably different from the pattern of risk sharing 
for the entire sample. There are, however, a few interesting exceptions. The first exception 
is the positive contribution made by factor income flows to the ‘core’ EU countries, 
reflecting the impact of the cross-ownership of assets. It could be that individuals in the 
‘core’ economies of the EU hold a more regionally diversified portfolio of assets than the 
rest of our sample of countries, due to a larger degree of integration of their economies. 
Another exception is the positive role played by international transfers for the subset of G7 
economies, ‘core’ EU countries and the three southern ‘peripheral’ countries of the EU. 
However, all these subgroups of countries have a larger amount of shocks left unsmoothed 
(62% for the EU ‘core’ against 59% for all EU15). This result is due to a small degree of 
smoothing through saving, particularly for southern ‘peripheral’ EU countries and for the 
EU ‘core’, where saving only smoothes 41% and 44% respectively of shocks. The EU15 
figure stands at 51%. 
 
3.3  The contribution made by private and government sectors to 
consumption smoothing 
As mentioned above, the impact of net saving on the smoothing of consumption is the 
result of the net saving behaviour of three sectors: households, corporations and the 
government. We can only shed light on the question of determining whether the financial 
markets could replace the government in the role of smoothing output by discriminating 
between government and private saving contributions to smoothing. Moreover, it is very 
interesting to find out which of these three sectors contributes the most to smoothing. Due 
to data availability limitations, we are only going to differentiate between two sectors: the 
government and the private. In the private sector, there are contributions made by both 
personal saving behaviour (households) and corporate behaviour. However, according to 
Sørensen and Yosha’s results (1998: 231-2) “personal saving contributes nothing to cross-
country consumption smoothing”,
25 which implies that almost all of the reported private 




In order to estimate such effects, ASY98 methodology will be used. ASY98 were 
also only able to differentiate between two sectors because of data limitations.  We start by 
remembering that the incremental smoothing provided by total net saving (βs) is obtained 
by the regression: 
                                                 
25 SY98 were able to distinguish the three components of saving because they used a more restricted sample 
of 13 OECD countries for which detailed data was available. 




ii i i i
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To break the smoothing provided by total net saving down further into private and 
government saving, we will use the following regression: 
 
ii i i i
t t t x,t SX t x,t logDNI log(DNI X ) logGDP u ∆− ∆ − = ν + β ∆+  (5) 
 
where the generic variable X is either net government saving or net private saving.  
 
Table 3 – Decomposition of smoothing provided by total net saving into 
government and private sectors 1970-1999 




Government  29 27 21 25 18 26 
  (7) 
 
(6) (4) (5) (3) (5) 
Private  21 24 32 28 37 26 
  (4) 
 
(4) (4) (4) (4) (3) 
Total saving (βs)  50 51 53 52 55 52 
  (15) (12) (11) (12  )  (9) (10) 
Notes: see notes to Table 2 for description of the samples of countries considered, and text for details. 
 
Table 3 presents the results.
27 In general, the contribution made by the government 
sector to smoothing is larger than that of the private sector. For the whole OECD19 sample, 
the government sector is found to smooth 29% of the shocks for the period 1971-1999, 
while the private sector saving behaviour was responsible for 21% of smoothing. The 
figures for the EU15 are very similar (27% and 24%, respectively). For these countries, the 
government sector is responsible for more than 50% of the smoothing due to saving. Euro-
12 countries show, however, a different pattern of smoothing: the private sector (32%) 
contributes more to smoothing than the government (21%). The same pattern showing the 
predominance of private sector saving smoothing is also found in the small-country sub-
sample, especially for the subset of small euro-area economies. For the latter, the gap 
between public and private smoothing through saving is the largest of all: the private sector 
saving smoothes 37% of the shocks while the government smoothes only 18%. The lower 
degree of risk sharing through the government sector in small countries may be the result of 
the lower effectiveness of automatic fiscal stabilisers at smoothing output in relatively 
small economies (see Marinheiro (2003: Chapter 3)).  
 
3.4  Consumption smoothing: high vs. low deficit countries  
An attempt will now be made to answer the question regarding whether the 
contribution made by public sector saving to output smoothing is the same irrespective of 
                                                 
27 Following ASY98, no correction for first order serial correlations was made while estimating the 
government and private contributions as such a correction was considered to be unjustified.  
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government deficit. According to recent literature, the higher the budget deficit or the debt 
accumulation, the lower the effectiveness of fiscal stabilisers.
28 In order to test this 
hypothesis it is necessary  to distinguish high from low deficit countries.
29 ASY98 propose 
to split the sample according to the average deficit over the sample period for each country. 
They found no evidence that the deficit level affects the amount of consumption smoothing 
provided by the public, or private, sectors (ASY98: 17). The reason for this lack of 
evidence is the difference in behaviour between the EU and OECD samples. While for the 
EU sample the authors concluded that the smoothing through the government sector is 
higher for low deficit countries, the conclusion is the opposite for the larger OECD group.  
For the OECD group ASY98 found more smoothing in high-deficit countries. However, it 
should be mentioned that in their applied work, ASY98 considered net government saving 
to be equal to the negative of the deficit (ASY98: 17). As a result, they rather imperfectly 
used net saving data to distinguish high from low deficit countries instead of using 
government net lending data. As can be seen by the formulae in Appendix A, these two 
measures are only equivalent when government net capital transfers and government 
consumption of fixed capital are equal to government gross capital formation and 
government purchases of land and intangible assets, i.e. when the capital budget balance is 
exactly the symmetric of government capital consumption.
30 
 
Table 4 – Decomposition of smoothing provided by total net saving into government and private 
sectors – high vs. low deficit countries -using ASY definition 
 1970-1999    1980-1993   1986-1999 
  All   EU15  Small  All  OECD17 
(SY98)   All 
Deficit level →  High  Low    High  Low High Low High Low  High  Low  High Low 
Governmt.  15  53 12  55  8  55 24  80  40  31  15 81 
  (3) 
 
(7) (2)  (6) (1) (5) (3) (7) (7)  (6) (2)  (7)
Private  37 2 41  -4 49  -1 23  -25  12  6  24 -14 
  (5) 
 
(0) (5)  (0) (5) (0) (2) (2) (2)  (2) (2)  (1)
Total    52  54 54  51 56  54 47  55  52  37  39 67 
Saving (βs)  (11) (12)  (9)  (9) (9) (9) (7) (7) (10)  (6) (5)  (9)
Notes: see notes to Table 2 for a description of the samples of countries considered. High deficit countries: those with an 
average deficit above the average deficit of the sample (2.76%). Low deficit countries: Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Japan, Norway, and Sweden. High deficit countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Spain, the U.K., Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the USA. The shaded columns regarding OECD17 are from SY98, table 3.9, 
page 32. 
 
                                                 
28 Just see for example Perotti (1999) and Artis and Buti (2000). 
29 A direct test regarding whether the level of public debt has any impact on the amount of risk sharing 
provided by the government sector was also carried out. The results obtained (but unreported here for brevity) 
are very similar to those obtained in this section. 
30 In other words, and neglecting net capital transfers, this assumption is only true when the amount of 
government net capital formation is nill. When considering the whole economy, as described by a Solow 
growth model, zero net capital formation (i.e., capital depreciation equal to capital formation) is only obtained 
when we assume that the economy is at a steady state with no technical progress and no population growth. 
These assumptions are very difficult to sustain in the case of industrialised countries, consequently ASY98’s 




In Table 4, the method proposed by ASY98 was used to distinguish such sub-groups 
(but using net governement lending data). That is, we considered  “high deficit countries” 
to be those that showed, over the period 1970-1999, an average deficit above the 
unweighted average deficit of the whole sample, which was 2.76%. As a result, our group 
of high deficit countries consisted of eleven countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Spain, 
the U.K., Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the USA), and the remaing 
eight countries consisted of the low deficit countries (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Japan, Norway, and Sweden).  
 
The empirical results lead clearly to the conclusion that a large government budget 
deficit has indeed a negative effect on the amount of consumption smoothing through 
government net saving. Both for the 19 OECD countries and the EU-15 economies, the 
consumption smoothing provided by the government sector is substantially higher for low 
deficit countries. For all 19 OECD economies, government saving smoothes 53% of the 
shocks for low deficit countries, while for high deficit countries the smoothing level is only 
of 15%. Even during the ASY98 period of 1980-93, we found no evidence that for OECD 
countries the smoothing of shocks provided by the government sector is higher for high 
deficit countries.
31 Another conclusion drawn from the results is that the amount of private 
and government smoothing appears to be substitute: the amount of total net saving 
smoothing does not differ considerably between high and low deficit countries.
32 For low 
deficit countries, almost all the smoothing is provided by government saving behaviour, 
while for high deficit countries the major provider of consumption smoothing through 
saving is the private sector.  
 
As for the small countries, they show the same pattern, with the exception of an 
unusually low contribution from the government sector net saving to smoothing in high 
deficit countries. It should be noted that all the Nordic countries along with Austria are 
included in the low-deficit-small-country subgroup. These are countries that have large 
fiscal stabilisers, which help to explain the high contribution made by the government 
sector in this subgroup. 
 
                                                 
31 To aid comparison, Table 4 also includes the ASY98 results for the OECD17 group. 
32 In general, the amount of smoothing provided by the private sector is not statistically different from zero for 
low-deficit countries.  
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Table 5 – Decomposition of smoothing provided by total net saving into government and private 
sectors- high vs. low deficit countries –using Deficit above/below average definition 
  1970-1999  1980-1993  1986-1999 
  All   EU15  Small  OECD   All 
Deficit level →  Above Below  Above Below  Above Below  Above Below  Above Below 
Governmt.  19 29    17 26  7 25  24 48    34 40 
 (3) 
 
(6)    (2) (5)  (1) (4)  (2) (7)    (3) (6) 
Private  37 18    45 18  60 20  4  5    -4  7 
 (3) 
 
(3)    (3) (3)  (4) (3)  (0) (1)    (0) (1) 
Total  saving    56 46    62 44  67 45  28 53    31 47 
(βs)  (8)  (13)    (8) (9)  (7) (9)  (3)  (10)    (4) (9) 
Notes: see notes to Table 2 for a description of the samples of countries considered. Each year a country is classified as 
being a high deficit country if its government budget deficit surpasses the (unweighed) average deficit of the whole sample 
of 19 OECD economies by at least 1%.  
 
 
In Table 5, another method was used to distinguish low-deficit from high-deficit sub-
samples. Namely, the classification of countries was allowed to vary over time. Each year a 
country was considered as having a large deficit if its deficit level was substantially above 
the (unweighted) average  budget deficits of the aggregate OECD19 recorded in that year. 
More precisely, a country was classified as having an ‘above normal’ deficit in year t, when 
its budget deficit for that period was larger than the average OECD deficit by at least 1%. 
Deficits were defined as ‘below’ in all other cases. 
 
The empirical results show that the sample of ‘below average’ deficit benefits from a 
larger (and statistically significant) contribution from government saving to output 
smoothing. This result underscores the previous conclusion that a high deficit leads to a 
reduction in the amount of smoothing provided by net government saving. Again it was 
found that for small countries, an ‘above normal’ deficit results in a very small contribution 
from the government sector to the smoothing of consumption shocks.
33 However, an 
increase in the contribution of the private sector more than compensates for this decrease. 
For the whole period 1970-1999, it was found that the ‘above-average’ deficit sub-sample 
displayed a higher amount of total smoothing provided by saving. However, this somewhat 
unexpected result does not hold for the 1980-1993 nor for the 1986-1999 subperiods.  
 
3.5  Comparison with the states of the USA 
It is very interesting to compare the results obtained for our group of countries with 
those obtained for the states of the USA by Asdrubali et al. (1996), hereafter referred to as 
ASY96. In order to do so, it will be necessary aggregate our more detailed results into three 
levels of smoothing: capital market, transfers and credit market. Capital market smoothing 
corresponds to the sum of factor income, capital depreciation, and corporate saving 
smoothing. Using Sørensen and Yosha’s conclusion (1998: 231-2) on the non-relevance of 
                                                 
33 This contribution is not statistically different from zero.  
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personal saving, our estimate assumes that the amount of personal saving smoothing is nil. 
Transfers refer to international transfer smoothing. Credit market smoothing corresponds to 
smoothing through both personal and government saving.  
 
Table 6 shows both the SY98 estimates and our own for the period 1981-1990. The 
results for our sample of 19 OECD economies are relatively close to those of SY98, which 
related to their more restricted sample of 12 OECD countries: the amount of unsmoothed 
shocks was found to be similar (62% in our estimate, 57% in the SY98 sample). However, 
the smoothing by capital markets was higher in the SY98 estimates (15% compared with 
8% for our sample of countries), and the results for the EU countries were substantially 
different from those reported in SY98.  The unusually low level of credit market smoothing 
reported by SY98 for their six EU countries (3%) was not found with our sample of EU15 
economies. Our estimate was much closer to the result reported for the OECD (19%). 
Nevertheless, both in our own estimate and in that of SY98, when the OECD and the EU 
samples are compared, the latter displays a much lower level of smoothing provided by the 
credit market, which in turn implies a larger amount of unsmoothed shocks. These 
differences in the smoothing due to the credit market channel are the result of the different 
government contributions made to smoothing. They may also reflect differences in the 
relative importance of the banking sector, and in particular variations in relationship 
lending between Continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world. 
 
Table 6 – Comparison of income and consumption smoothing: EU, OECD, and 
US States – SY98 and our own results for the period 1981-1990 
 SY98    Own  estimate 
 US  states  OECD*  EC6    All  EU15 
Capital markets  48  15  8  8  9 
  (12) 
 
(4)  (1)  (0)  (0) 
Transfers  14  2  7  3  5 
  (14) 
 
(2)  (2)  (2)  (2) 
Credit market  19  26  3  27  19 
  (2) 
 
(5)  (0)  (4)  (2) 
Not smoothed  19  57  82  62  68 
  (2)  (11)  (9)  (11)  (8) 
Notes: see notes to Table 2 for a description of the samples of countries considered. The source of 
the first three columns is ASY96, table 1, page  1092. EC6: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, and UK. OECD*: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, UK, 
USA, Japan, Australia, and Canada. ASY96 report standard errors in their tables, thus the 
corresponding T-stats for ASY96 were obtained by dividing the coefficient estimate by its standard 
deviation, ignoring any (non-reported) rescaling. Capital markets smoothing corresponds to the sum 
of factor income, capital depreciation, and corporate saving smoothing. Transfers refer to 
international transfer smoothing. Credit market smoothing corresponds to smoothing through 
personal and government saving. Our estimate assumes that the amount of personal saving 





Comparing the results for the US states with those of our estimates for the EU15, for 
the period 1981-1990, it can be seen that the amount of shocks left unsmoothed is much 
higher in the EU than within the US federation (68% compared with only 19%). This is 
mainly the result of the enormous difference in the amount of smoothing provided by the 
capital markets. Capital markets smooth 48% of asymmetric shocks to the US states GSP, 
while in the EU they only smooth 9% of the idiosyncratic shocks to GDP.
34 The role of the 
US federal tax-transfer system at smoothing output (14%) is also considerably higher than 
the contribution of international transfers to smoothing shocks to EU output (5%). 
Interestingly, the amount smoothed by the credit market is exactly the same in both 
estimates (19%).
35 As the credit market smoothing mainly measures the smoothing 
provided by government saving behaviour, it can be concluded that the public sector plays 
a crucial role in the smoothing of asymmetric shocks in Europe. Sørensen and Yosha 
(1998) go even further and conclude that the restrictions on national budget deficits 
imposed by the European Union Treaty should be relaxed to allow governments to smooth 
output shocks. They further maintain that a greater insurance role for the EU budget may be 
demanded by national governments, until the degree of integration of the EU credit market 
allows a substantial amount of consumption smoothing via personal saving.
36  
 


































































































Notes: see notes to Table 2 for a description of the samples of countries considered. T-statistics are given in brackets. 
The source of the two columns is ASY96, table I and table III (pages 1092 and 1094). ASY96 report standard errors in 
their tables, thus the corresponding T-stats for ASY96 were obtained by dividing the coefficient estimate by its 
                                                 
34 Moreover, the amount of capital market smoothing is not statistically different from zero for the EU, while 
it is highly statistically significant for the US states. 
35 Both such estimates present a T-statistic of 2. 
36 More recently, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003) updated the SY98 and ASY98 estimates. 
However, the new results are not directly comparable to previous ones as the authors changed the estimation 
method and limited their study to just the first channel of output smoothing, i.e., the smoothing that occurs 
through factor income. They found that factor income makes a positive contribution to smoothing in the more 
recent period of 1993-2000. More precisely, factor income was found to smooth 6% of the shocks to GDP in 
the EU-14 countries [11% in the former EU8], which compares with 55% in the US states. This partial 
analysis led the authors to change their previous conclusions of SY98 to state that “… the unified Europe is 
becoming more similar to the union of US states in terms of integration at the macroeconomic level!” (idem, 
p. 2). In our opinion, this conclusion might be rushed since it is based on just one channel of smoothing 
(disregarding the total amount of unsmoothed shocks), and on a very short period of time.  
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standard deviation, ignoring any (non-reported) rescaling. The third column for the US, is obtained by using Bent 
Sørensen’s database and his econometric program. Capital market smoothing corresponds to the sum of factor income, 
capital depreciation, and corporate saving smoothing. Transfers refers to international transfer smoothing. Credit 
market smoothing corresponds to smoothing through personal saving and government saving. Our estimate assumes 
that the amount of personal saving smoothing is nil. 
 
Table 7 shows our estimates for the full 1970-1999 period together with ASY96’s 
results for the US states for the periods 1964-1970 and 1981-1990. We included as well, 
updated estimates for the US states for the period 1970-1998. These estimates were 
obtained by using Bent Sørensen’s database and econometric program.  
For the period 1970-1999, our results relative to the three channels of smoothing do 
not vary substantially for the different subsamples of countries considered. In the OECD, 
the most important channel of output smoothing is the credit market (it represents 29% of 
smoothing achieved by the 19 OECD economies).
37 Next in importance, comes the capital 
market smoothing (12% for the same group). International transfers actually dis-smooth 
output (-1% for OECD19), but are not statistically different from zero.
38 As in Table 2, the 
amount of shocks left unsmoothed is around 60% for the several subsamples considered. 
Comparing the small countries with the enlarged group of 19 OECD economies, the former 
shows a higher degree of smoothing through the capital markets (19%), and a somewhat 
lower smoothing through the credit market (25%). Overall, the amount of shocks smoothed 
by the three channels is roughly the same, being the amount of shocks left unsmoothed 
(59%) for both groups of countries. The small euro-area economies display a similar picture 
to the more extended sample of small OECD countries, showing, however, a higher degree 
of capital market smoothing (30%) and a lower smoothing through the credit market. 
Adding the 3% of dis-smoothing provided by the international transfers, we arrive at a total 
of 55% of shocks left unsmoothed. 
 
As for the twelve euro-area legacy countries, they show a level of capital market 
smoothing of 25%, which is higher by 13 percentage points (p.p.) than in the OECD19. 
However, the degree of risk sharing provided by the credit market (21%) is 8 p.p. below the 
figure for the whole sample. As a result, the total amount of unsmoothed shocks is 56%, 
only 3 percentage points below the figure for the whole sample of 19 OECD economies. 
Consequently, from the viewpoint of cross-country risk sharing, it appears that before the 
period of introduction of the euro (1999), the euro-area economies were not substantially 
better prepared to embrace monetary union than the rest of the OECD countries considered 
in our study. 
 
                                                 
37 It should be remembered that the credit market channel corresponds to the smoothing achieved via 
government net saving. 
38 When comparing the t-statistics of the ASY96 estimates for the US states, and our own estimates for OECD 
countries we can see that for the US states the capital market smoothing and transfers have been estimated 
precisely, while for our sample of international countries higher standard deviations were found. Conversely, 
our estimates for the credit market channel and for the total amount of unsmoothed shocks show much lower 
standard deviations than ASY96’s estimates for the US states. A similar pattern is apparent in the SY98 
estimates (see Table 6).  
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According to our results, an eventual enlargement of the euro zone to include the UK, 
Denmark, and Sweden, i.e. to all EU-15 members, will lead to a small increase in the 
amount of unsmoothed shocks (3 p.p.). This is the result of a smaller capital market 
contribution to smoothing in these three ‘non-participating’ countries (the difference 
between EU-15 and EU-12 is -10 p.p.), which is not fully compensated for by higher credit 
market smoothing, i.e. government led smoothing (+6 p.p.). 
 
Comparing the euro-area with the federation of the USA, it can be seen that the 
amount of total risk sharing is considerably lower in the former group of countries, where 
the amount of shocks left unsmoothed is 56%, which compares with only 20% for the US. 
With regard to the different channels of risk sharing, the credit market smoothing in the 
EU12 countries (21%) exactly the same amount of its equivalent in the US (in the 1970-
1998 period). However, the main differences between the two regions are the amount of 
risk sharing provided by transfers and by the capital markets. While in the US the federal 
government tax and transfers system smoothes 14% of the idiosyncratic regional shocks, in 
the EU12 such an inter-regional transfer system does not exist. The international transfers 
actually dis-smooth output by 2%. The amount of risk sharing provided by the capital 
markets in the euro-area legacy countries (25%) is also substantially below (approximately 
just half) that of the US states (45% for the period  1970-1998, and 48% for 1981-1990). 
This is most probably the result of a much lower degree of cross-country ownership of 
productive assets than in the monetary union of the United States.  
 
If, due to the introduction of the euro, capital markets become as integrated in the 
euro-area as they were in the US federation in the 1970-1998 period, an increase of 20 p.p. 
in the amount of risk sharing provided by euro-area capital markets could be expected. 
Everything else constant, the amount of shocks unsmoothed is expected to drop to 36% in 
this scenario. However, the total amount of shocks left unsmoothed in the euro-area would 
still be considerably larger than the 20% found in the US states, due to the lack of 
smoothing through international transfers in the euro-area. A larger EU central budget 
might help in this regard. However, it could also be argued that the Stability and Growth 
Pact dispositions, which constrain the operation of fiscal policy within the EMU, might 
lead to a reduction of the amount of smoothing provided by the credit markets, which is 
mainly the result of government net saving smoothing. 
 
3.6  More persistent shocks 
It is also interesting to observe what happens when the length of the differencing 
frequency interval is increased from one to three years.
39 Such an increase in the 
differencing interval allows an analysis of the response of the economy to more long-
lasting shocks to be made. Table 8 shows the results obtained.  
 
                                                 
39 For example, the variation of GDP is now defined as (GDPt - GDPt-3).  
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Table 8- Channels of income and consumption spending 
(%)- 3 years differencing interval 
 All  Small  EU15  EU12  Small 
EU12 
Factor income (βf)  -5 -5 -5 -4 -4 
 (4) 
 
(3) (3) (2) (2) 
Capital Depreciation (βd)  -5  -4  -4  -4  -4 
  (4) 
 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
International   1 0 0 0  -1 
Transfers (βt)  (1) 
 
(0) (0) (0) (1) 
Saving (βs)  35  37  34  37  41 
  (11) 
 
(9)  (9)  (8)  (7) 
- Of which government  33 30 31 25 23 
  (10) 
 
(7) (8) (7) (5) 
- Of which private  2  6  3  12  18 
  (0) 
 
(1)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Not Smoothed (βu)  74 72 74 71 68 
  (28) (21) (22) (18) (14) 
Notes: see notes to Table 2 for a description of the samples of countries considered. Results 
obtained without correcting for serial correlation. 
 
When the differencing frequency is increased to three years, the amount of long-
lasting, unsmoothed shocks increases considerably: almost ¾ of all shocks remain 
unsmoothed (across the whole sample this value increases from 59% to 74%). Now both 
factor income and capital depreciation dis-smooth output, and international transfers are 
more or less irrelevant within this time scale. The latter contribution is almost nil and is not 
statistically different from zero. The only operative channel for smoothing output is net 
saving. For the whole sample of 19 OECD countries, saving smoothes 35% of all shocks at 
the 3 years horizon. When we previously considered shocks that lasted for just one year, i.e.  
at the one year differencing frequency interval, this value was much higher (50%).  
 
Taking this further by subdividing the contribution from total net saving into public 
and private components, we reach the very interesting conclusion that at the 3-year horizon, 
the smoothing effect of saving is almost exclusively due to the public sector (33%) while 
private saving contributes almost nothing to risk sharing (2%). As mentioned above, at the 
one-year differencing frequency interval the contribution from both sectors were more or 
less balanced, with a slight prominence coming from the public sector. Hence, when 
dealing with more persistent shocks only government saving appears to be effective at 
providing risk sharing. However, the contribution of private sector saving to risk sharing is 
comparatively more important in the case of small countries (6%) and is especially so for 
the euro-area economies (12%).  
 
A possible explanation for this is that, according to the results of SY98, the 
contribution to smoothing from private saving is mainly the result of corporate saving  
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behaviour. Since corporations do not make final consumption expenditures, the net saving 
of corporations must be equal to their net disposable income.
40 In other words, corporation 
savings correspond to retained earnings. Consequently, our results show that when a 
negative shock only lasts for a period, corporations are able to reduce the amount of 
retained earnings in order to maintain the amount of distribution of dividends (increasing 
the payout ratio), thus helping to stabilise shareholders’ income. In order to do so the 
corporations may also have to resort to increasing external finance. This is because the 
operating surplus (and profits) are negatively affected by the shock on GDP and some 
expenditure, namely employee compensation and investment plans, may not be 
immediately adjusted (i.e., downgraded). However, this reaction on the part of corporations 
is not sustainable when a negative shock lasts over a longer period. Only the government 
sector has the ability to resort to debt in order to sustain the decrease in net savings over 
such a longer period of time.  
 
3.7  Evolution of smoothing patterns over time 
Table 9- Channels of income and consumption spending (%) –evolution over time 



















Factor income (βf)  -1 -3 -2 -1  -2  -1 0  -1  0 
 (1) 
 
(1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (0)  (1)  (0) 
Capital Depreciation   -7  -8  -7  -8  -7  -7  -7  -7  -7 
(βd)  (5) 
 
(4)  (7)    (5)  (3)  (6)    (4)  (3)  (6) 
International   -2 2 -1 -3  2  -1 -4  2  -2 
Transfers (βt) (2) 
 
(2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Saving (βs)  52  49  50  54  46  51  56  51  53 
  (11) 
 
(9)  (15)    (9)  (7)  (12)    (8)  (6)  (11) 
-Of which 
government 
17 46 29 15 43 27 10 37 21
  (3) 
 
(7)  (7)   (3)  (5)  (6)   (2)  (4)  (4) 
-Of which private  35  3  21 39 2 24 46  15  32
(5) 
 
(0)  (4)    (5)  (0)  (4)    (5)  (1)  (4) 
Not Smoothed (βu)  58 60 59 58  61  59 56  54  56 
 (13)  (15)  (20)  (10)  (12)  (16)  (8)  (9)  (13) 
Notes: see notes to Table 2 for description of the samples of countries considered. 
 
 
The evolution of the pattern of consumption smoothing over time will now be 
analysed. In Table 9 two sub-periods (1970-85 and 1986-99) can be recognised. Over these 
                                                 
40  See Commission of the European Communities/Eurostat, Imf, Oecd et al. (1993: paragraph 9.4).  
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two subperiods, it can be seen that the major channels of risk sharing show great stability 
across the whole set of 19 countries: factor income contributes negatively to smoothing, 
increasing the dis-smoothing from -1% to -3%; capital depreciation also contributes 
negatively to smoothing (varying from -7% to -8%); the smoothing provided by saving is 
around 50%; and the amount left unsmoothed varies from 58% to 60%. On the contrary, the 
contribution to smoothing from international transfers varies within the sub-periods: for the 
first sub-period it contributes negatively to smoothing (-2%), but in the more recent period 
of 1986-99 it contributes in a more modest but nonetheless positive way to smoothing 
(+2%). Notwithstanding this general regularity, a closer look at the two subcomponents of 
total savings reveals substantial changes over time. For all 19 OECD economies, the 
contribution from private saving decreases considerably from the first to the second period 
(from 35% to 3%). Such a decline is compensated for by a substantial increase in the 
contribution to risk sharing from government saving, which increases from 17% to 46%. 
Thus, while the aggregated contribution of saving remains roughly the same, its 
composition differs radically between both sub-periods.  
The pattern observed for the EU15 countries does not differ significantly from that of 
the 19 OECD economies. However, the euro-area countries differ from the aggregated 
OECD pattern by showing a less pronounced decrease in the contribution to smoothing 
from private saving from the first to the second sub-periods considered: for the period 
1986-99 the net private saving contribution to smoothing drops to 15% in EU12. 
Notwithstanding these less clear results for the euro-area, the instability in the sub-
components of saving led us to analyse the pattern of time evolution in more detail. 
 
In  Table 10 (Appendix B), we distinguish between 3 sub-periods at the cost of 
decreasing the number of degrees of freedom i.e. 1971-79, 1980-89, and 1990-99. 
Nevertheless, the number of degrees of freedom is still large. By analysing the evolution of 
the two subcomponents of saving, it can be seen that the aforementioned low value for the 
private saving contribution to smoothing in the 1986-99 period is due to the 1980s. For the 
whole sample of OECD countries, the private saving contribution in the 1970s was 
relatively large (42%); in the 1980s this positive contribution became almost non-existent 
(2%); and, finally it regained some of its importance in the 1990s (12%). The government 
saving contribution to risk sharing increased considerably and systematically over time 
(from 11% in the 1970s, to 39% in the 1980s, and finally to 45% in the 1990s). The same 
evolution is also present in the EU12 sub-sample. Due to this pattern, the contribution of 
total saving for smoothing decreases considerably in the 1980s. As this decrease is not 
compensated for by positive changes in the other main components, whose contribution 
remains roughly unaltered, this ultimately leads to an increase in the amount of unsmoothed 
shocks in the 1980s. The recovery in government saving smoothing in the 1990s gives rise 
to an important decrease in the amount of shocks to GDP left unsmoothed in that period. 
 
At the cost of another reduction in the degrees of freedom, Table 11 (Appendix B) 




41 This subdivision enables us to conclude that the decrease in the amount of 
shocks left unsmoothed in the 1990s for the euro area is largely the result of an unusually 
high smoothing effect provided by the government saving in the first half of the 1990s 
(67%). However, the contribution to smoothing of the government sector decreases 
considerably (to just 13%) in the 1995-1999 period. This was probably due to fiscal 
tightening in the run-up to EMU. 
 
This detailed subdivision also shows an interesting evolution of the factor income 
contribution to smoothing in the euro-area countries. Namely, there was a high instability 
of this parameter in the 1990s. The first half of the decade was characterized by an 
unusually high negative contribution of this factor (-14%). As mentioned above, this could 
be related to the impact of the collapse of the USSR on Nordic-countries trade, and with the 
effects of German reunification and the EMS crisis (vide page 11). Conversely, in the 
second half of the 1990s, factor income flows are found to contribute positively to 
smoothing in the EU-12 (17%). One could interpret this result as giving an indication that 
the cross-ownerships of assets in the EU is increasing and already giving a large 
contribution to the smoothing of asymmetric shocks in output.
42 However, in our view, it is 
not possible to draw such a conclusion from our results. As the βf parameter revealed such a 
large instability in the nineties, it is not at all possible to claim, based on only one-half a 
decade sub-period, that this positive contribution will continue to be present in the near 
future. Moreover, our results show also that, even in the more recent period 1995-1999, 
53% of the idiosyncratic shocks to output remain unsmoothed in the euro-area legacy 
countries, which is still 2.8 times more than in the US states for the period 1981-1990 
(19%), and 5.9 times more than in the US for the comparable period 1995-1998 (9%).
43 
 
4-  Conclusions 
We have presented empirical results regarding the patterns of risk sharing for a 
sample of 19 OECD economies, which includes all EU-15 member countries (except 
Luxembourg), for the period 1970-1999, i.e., for the thee decades running up to the 
introduction of the euro. Following Sørensen and Yosha (1998), we identified four channels 
of risk sharing: factor income flows, capital depreciation, international transfers and saving. 
We concluded that the only operative smoothing channel is saving. Total net saving was 
found to smooth 50% of the idiosyncratic shocks to GDP in our 19 OECD economies, 
while 59% of the shocks remained unsmoothed, i.e. causing a shock in consumption. Such 
amount of shocks left unsmoothed is considerably higher than the 25% found for the US 
states by Asdrubali et al. (1996), for the period 1964-1990. 
                                                 
41 There is also a reduction in the precision of parameter estimates probably as a result of the reduction in the 
degrees of freedom. In spite of this, we still believe it to be a worthwhile exercise. 
42 Just see Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) and our comments on footnote 36 (on page 19). 
43 By using Prof. Bent Sørensen’s econometric program for the US states, we found that only 9% of the inter-
regional asymmetric shocks were left unsmoothed in the US for the period 1995-1998. The amount of 
smoothing due to the capital market was found to be 48%; the transfers smoothed another 11% of shocks; and 




With regard to the question of knowing whether euro-area countries were better 
prepared than the rest of the OECD economies considered, no substantial differences in the 
pattern of risk sharing among our different subsets of small, EU-15, and EU-12 economies 
were found. The amount of idiosyncratic shocks to GDP left unsmoothed in the Euroland 
was 56%, which is very similar to the figure for the whole sample of OECD countries 
(59%).  Hence, we can conclude that, from the risk-sharing point of view, the euro-legacy 
countries do not appear to be better prepared to engage in a monetary union than the rest of 
the other OECD countries. Moreover, as in the OECD, only saving contributes positively to 
smoothing in the euro-area. 
 
As the contribution from saving to smoothing may be divided into government and 
private components, it is possible to evaluate whether the private sector can substitute the 
government sector in providing output smoothing. We have concluded that for the whole 
sample of OECD countries the government sector contributed more to risk sharing (29%) 
than the private sector (21%). However, both small countries and the EU12 countries, and 
especially the small EU12 member states, show a contribution to risk sharing from the 
private sector which is higher than that of the government sector. In the case of small 
countries, this result may reflect the reduced effectiveness of automatic fiscal stabilisers. 
Although the contribution from the private sector in euro-area (32%) is larger than that of 
the government (21%), the contribution from the government is still decisive, especially in 
smoothing more persistent shocks to output. Moreover, as we will argue below, the 
smoothing due to government saving is not likely to be easily replaced by private capital 
markets in the near future.  
 
However, fiscal profligacy was found to reduce the contribution to smoothing from 
the public sector. When high and low deficit countries were considered separately it was 
found, contrary to Arreaza et al. (1998), that there was clear evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that a high deficit level leads to reduced consumption smoothing by the public 
sector. Such results lead us to conclude that in a successful monetary union it is vital to 
ensure there is enough short-time flexibility in the fiscal policy, while at the same time not 
disregarding fiscal discipline in the medium/long-term. 
 
We compared as well our results for OECD and EU countries with those of Asdrubali 
et al. (1996) for the US states. According to their updated estimates, for the period 1970-
1998 in the US states, only 20% of idiosyncratic shocks were left unsmoothed. Their results 
further show that insurance, i.e. capital market smoothing (45%), is much more important 
than credit (21%) in smoothing regional shocks in the USA. However, the credit channel 
itself is more important than the net transfers from the central federal government (14%). 
For the EU12 countries, in the period 1970-1999, capital market insurance was found to 
smooth 25% of the shocks to GDP; the credit markets (essentially government net saving) 
smoothed another 21%, while the international transfers actually dis-smoothed output 
(-2%). As a result, 56% of the asymmetric shocks went unsmoothed. Hence, when 
comparing the US federation with the euro-legacy countries, some major differences  
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emerge. Firstly, the amount of inter-regional shocks left unsmoothed in the euro-area (56%) 
is more than twice the equivalent amount in the US federation (20%). A second major 
difference between the EU12 and the US is that in the latter there is substantial inter-
regional smoothing through the federal government deficit (14%). This is absent in the euro 
legacy countries, where there is almost no inter-national smoothing through the EU central 
budget (international transfers were found to actually dis-smooth output by -2%). In 
contrast, the national governments budgets are found to have a decisive smoothing 
importance in the EU12. However, the national budgets provide mainly inter-temporal 
smoothing and not directly inter-regional smoothing. Thirdly, the amount of risk sharing 
provided by the capital markets in the EU12 is lower (25%) than in the US (45%). This 
lower insurance role is probably the result of the less-regionally diversified portfolios of 
assets among the residents of EU countries in comparison with their US counterparts.
44  
 
More smoothing is to be expected from market forces due to the functioning of EMU. 
EMU makes it is easier for countries to borrow internationally (before the introduction of 
the euro it was easier for individuals to borrow from within their own country than for 
countries to borrow from the rest of the world). In the long run, economic integration 
favours the holding of property claims across borders, i.e. it favours the cross-ownership of 
productive assets. If, due to the introduction of the euro, capital markets become as 
integrated in the euro-area as they were in the US federation in 1970-1998, we could expect 
a gain of 20 p.p. in the amount of risk sharing provided by euro-area capital markets. 
Holding everything else constant, the amount of shocks left unsmoothed is expected to drop 
to 36% under this (optimistic) scenario, which is still considerably larger than the 20% left 
unsmoothed in the US states. A possible explanation for this result is the already mentioned 
lack of smoothing through international transfers in the euro-area. Therefore, a larger EU 
central budget, with objectives other than the redistribution of structural funds, might help 
in this regard. It is also possible to argue that the constraints imposed by the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the operation of fiscal policy in EMU, might lead to a 
reduction in the amount of smoothing provided by the credit markets, which is mainly the 
result of government net saving smoothing. Some SGP partisans argue that if member 
countries achieve a balanced budget position over the business cycle, the stability pact 
provides sufficient room-for-manoeuvre. However, this still remains to be proved in 
practice and is a source of concern. 
 
Another considerable difference between the Euro-area and the US States is the way 
in which such two economic areas react to more persistent shocks. When the differencing 
frequency period is increased to three years, the amount of long-lasting unsmoothed shocks 
for the euro-area increases considerably: almost ¾ of all shocks remain unsmoothed. In the 
US States the increase in the amount of shocks left unsmoothed is much smaller (ranging 
                                                 
44 Although the comparison of the euro-area with the US enables us to see some very interesting insights, we 
should mention that this comparison is not perfect. There is, in fact, a little asymmetry in the comparison 
between both regions due to the different methods used to reach the results for the US and for the EU. For the 
latter we split total net saving into government and private saving. This was not done in the US studies, which 
makes the comparison more difficult.  
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from 25% to 34%), reflecting the decrease in the smoothing provided by credit markets (-
16%) that is not compensated for by increases in capital markets (5%) or by federal 
government smoothing (3%).
45 In contrast, in Europe the only operative channel for 
smoothing output is net saving (37%). Furthermore, the smoothing effect of saving is 
almost exclusively due to the public sector (25%). Consequently, in our opinion, limitations 
on the use of fiscal policy that induce a reduction in the amount of stabilisation provided by 
the government could have negative consequences for EU-12 economies. 
 
According to our results, an eventual enlargement of the euro zone to include the UK, 
Denmark, and Sweden, i.e. to all EU-15 members, would lead to a small increase in the 
amount of shocks left unsmoothed (3 p.p.). This would be the result of a smaller capital 
market contribution to smoothing in those three ‘out’ countries (the difference between EU-
15 and EU-12 is of -10 p.p.), which is not fully compensated for by higher credit market 
smoothing, i.e. government lead smoothing (+6 p.p.). Hence, such eventual enlargement is 
not likely to pose additional problems for risk sharing in the euro-zone. 
 
With regard to the pattern of consumption smoothing over time, we started by 
considering two sub-periods (1971-85 and 1986-99). Over these two sub-periods, the major 
channels of risk sharing show great stability. However, while the aggregated contribution of 
saving remains roughly the same, the contribution from government and private saving 
differs radically between both sub-periods. Consequently, we opted for considering three 
sub-periods: 1971-79, 1980-89, and 1990-99. For the whole sample of 19 OECD countries, 
the private saving contribution in the 1970s was relatively large (42%). In the 1980s, this 
positive contribution was considerably reduced (2%), but later partially recovered its 
importance in the 1990s (12%). Government saving contribution to risk sharing has 
increased considerably and systematically over time (from 11% in the 1970s, to 39% in the 
1980s, and finally to 45% in the 1990s).  
 
When considering a half-decade subdivision we concluded that the instability in the 
parameter estimate of factor income in the 1990s makes it almost impossible to extrapolate 
the evolution of this parameter into the near future. Consequently, in our view it is not 
possible to claim, as Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) did, that the cross-ownership of 
productive assets is already playing a decisive role in the euro-area making it similar to the 
US federation. On the contrary, even for the more recent period of 1995-1999, the total 
amount of idiosyncratic output shocks left unsmoothed is still 5.9 times that of the US 
states. Moreover, it appears that the fiscal tightening in the run-up to the single currency 




To sum up, no large differences in the pattern of risk sharing for OECD, EU-15 and 
euro-area legacy countries were found in our research. Nevertheless, there are considerable 
differences between the euro-area and the successful monetary union of the USA: the euro-
                                                 
45 According to Asdrubali et al. (1996) results for the 1964-1990 period.  
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area shows much lower insurance of asymmetric shocks than the US states. Until the 
increasing economic integration in Europe does not lead to a substantial decrease in the 
incidence of idiosyncratic shocks, such shocks could impose non-negligible welfare costs. 
Finally, due to the relatively large importance of the public sector at providing risk sharing, 
especially in smoothing more persistent shocks, it does not seem likely that private capital 
markets can easily substitute the government, in the near future, in providing a sufficient 
degree of risk sharing.  
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Appendix A- Data Sources 
The source of data used in this study was the OECD national accounts, available 
from the OECD Statistical Compendium 2001, edition 1, for the period 1970-1999. 
However, due to the unavailability of data for certain variables, particularly for certain 
individual countries, data from other sources was also used, and these are described below. 
Despite the resulting data set being the outcome of the imposition of certain hypotheses in 
making data from different sources compatible, it enables us to extend our sample to 19 
OECD economies, including all EU15 countries (with the exception of Luxembourg).  The 
sample comprises of the euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Greece), along with the remaining EU 
countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), and the five non-EU countries 
(Australia, Canada, Norway, United States, and Japan).
46  
Data is expressed in real per capita terms. Net factor income (NFI), national income 
(NI), and disposable national income (DNI) were deflated using the deflator of GDP. Due 
to the existence of blank values for 1999, we extended the following series using a simple 




Classification of countries 
Based on 1995 GDP and purchasing power parities (PPPs), OECD (1999: 192) has 
classified the members of the organization into two groups: 
­  seven major OECD economies: USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK and 
Canada 
­  and smaller OECD economies (all remaining countries). 
 
Fiscal data 
To break down total net saving data into government and private components we need 
data on at least one of those latter variables. Since, the OECD national accounts statistics 
are very incomplete for both subcomponents, we used data from the OECD Fiscal Positions 
and Business Cycles database (also available in the OECD Statistical Compendium 2001, 
edition 1) for government saving. The information in the boxes below recalls the definitions 
concerning government saving and government net lending. 
 
Government Gross Saving =   Total Current Receipts - Total Current disbursements 
 
Government Net Saving =   Government Gross Saving – Government Consumption 
of Fixed Capital 
 
Government Net Lending =   Government Gross Saving + Capital Transfers Received 
- (Gross Capital  Formation + Capital Transfers Paid + Purchases of Land 
and Intangible Assets)  
    =   Government Net Saving + Government Consumption of 
Fixed Capital + Capital Transfers Received - Gross Capital Formation - 
Capital Transfers Paid - Purchases of Land and Intangible Assets 
    =   Government Budget Balance 
 
                                                 
46 The considered OECD countries stand for 94-95% of OECD total GDP, as reported in OECD (1999). 
47 For Australian NFI the extrapolation was based only on the last two years due to a change in the growth 
rate.  
  31
It can be concluded from an examination of these relationships that, in order to obtain 
government net saving we need data on government gross saving and on government 
capital consumption. Government gross saving data comes from the variable “Savings, 
Government” of the OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles (FPBC) database, 
complemented with data from the European Commission (2000b) for: Denmark 1970-87; 
UK 1970-86; and Ireland 1970-76. 
The source of government net lending data (also known as the government budget 
balance) was again the FPBC database, complemented with data from the European 
Commission (2000b) on “Government budget balance” for:  Denmark: 1970; UK 1970-77; 
Greece 1970-74; and Ireland 1970-76. 
The source of data regarding government consumption of fixed capital was the “Gross 
saving, consumption of fixed capital government” variable of the FPBC database. 
Exceptions to this include data relating to: the UK, Denmark, France, Greece, and Portugal. 
For the UK the source of data was the variable “consumption fixed capital govt” from 
OECD National Accounts volume II database. Due to lack of data for Denmark, France, 
Greece, and Portugal in both FPBC and National accounts database, we resorted to a proxy. 
We assumed that the share of government capital consumption (GKC) in the total capital 
consumption of a nation (TKC) was directly linked to the share of public investment 
















In order to make the government consumption of fixed capital compatible with the 
other variables (expressed in real per capita terms), we used the previous variables 



















The government net saving as a percentage of GDP was first calculated. Then, 
assuming, as before, the same deflator for government net saving and GDP (Pt),  it was only 
necessary to multiply government net saving expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP by 
real per capita GDP (GDPRPC) to get the real per capita government net saving. 
Private sector net saving was then calculated as the difference between total net 
saving and government net saving. 
With regard to the quality of the above proxy for government consumption of fixed 
capital, we took the USA as benchmark, and compared the result of the proxy with actual 
data. The proxy only gave rise to a minor error: the average error for the period 1970-1999 
being only 0.2% of GDP. 
                                                 
48 Investment is defined as gross fixed capital formation, and its source is the OECD National Accounts 
volume I.  
 




Table 10- Channels of income and consumption spending smoothing (%): evolution over time- Further subdivision 
  All EU15  EU12 
  1971-79 1980-89 1990-99 1971-99   1971-79  1980-89  1990-99  1971-99   1971-79  1980-89  1990-99  1971-99 
Factor income (βf)  -2 -2 -1 -2 -1  -4  0  -1 0  -1  2  0 
 (1) 
 
(1) (0) (1)  (0)  (1)  (0)  (1)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Capital Depreciation (βd)  -6  -7  -8  -7  -7  -7  -7  -7  -7  -4  -8  -7 
  (4) 
 
(3)  (4)  (7)    (4)  (3)  (3)  (6)    (3)  (1)  (3)  (6) 
Internat. Transfers (βt)  -5 4 1 -1 -6  7  1  -1 -7  9  0  -2 
 (3) 
 
(3) (1) (1)  (3)  (3)  (0)  (1)  (3)  (3)  (0)  (2) 
Saving (βs)  53  41  57  50  58  34  57  51  61  27  67  53 
  (8) 
 
(7)  (9)  (15)    (7)  (4)  (7)  (12)    (7)  (3)  (7)  (11) 
- Of which government  11 39 45 29 15 29 45 27 11 19 44 21 
  (2) 
 
(5) (6) (7)   (2) (3) (5) (6)   (2) (2) (4) (4) 
- Of which private  42  2 12 21 42 4  12 24 50 8 22 32 
  (5) 
 
(0)  (1)  (4)    (4)  (0)  (1)  (4)    (5)  (0)  (1)  (4) 
Not Smoothed (βu)  60 64 50 59 56  70  50  59  53 70 39 56 
  (10) (11) (11) (20)   (8)  (9)  (8)  (16)  (6)  (6)  (6)  (13) 
Notes: see notes to Table 2 for description of the samples of countries considered. 
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Table 11- Channels of income and consumption spending smoothing (%): evolution over time- half a decade subdivision 
  All   EU12 
 1971-74  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 1971-99   1971-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 1971-99 
Factor income (βf)  -2 -1 2 -7  -11  12  -2    0 1 2 3  -14  17  0 
 (1) 
 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (3) (1)    (0) (0) (0) (0) (2) (3) (0) 
Capital Depreciation (βd)  -4  -9  -10  -3  -10  -6  -7    -1  -10  -11  2  -11  -5  -7 
  (1) 
 
(3)  (3)  (1)  (3)  (2)  (7)    (0)  (2)  (2)  (0)  (2)  (1)  (6) 
Internat. Transfers (βt)  -2  -8 3 5 1 1 -1    -4  -11  10  7 0 2 -2 
 (1) 
 
(3) (1) (2) (0) (1) (1)    (1) (2) (2) (1) (0) (1) (2) 
Saving (βs)  46  62  52  20  68  43  50    59  69  25  23  86  33  53 
  (4) 
 
(7)  (6)  (3)  (7)  (5)  (15)    (2)  (5)  (2)  (2)  (5)  (2)  (11) 
- Of which government  11 12 28 46 59 26 29   15 19 18 24 67 13  21 
  (1) 
 
(1) (3) (4) (5) (3) (7)   (2) (1) (0) (2) (4) (1) (4) 
- Of which private  35  50 24 -25 9 17 21    44 59 17 -1 18 21  32 
  (3) 
 
(4)  (2)  (2)  (1)  (1)  (4)    (3)  (4)  (1)  (0)  (1)  (1)  (4) 
Not Smoothed (βu)  61 55 53 84 52 51 59    46 51 73 66 40 53 56 
  (5) (7) (6)  (10)  (7) (8)  (20)    (2) (5) (3) (4) (3) (5)  (13) 
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